Abstract. A protocol-independent secrecy theorem is established and applied to several non-trivial protocols. In particular, it is applied to protocols proposed for protecting the computation results of free-roaming mobile agents doing comparison shopping. All the results presented here have been formally proved in Isabelle by building on Larry Paulson's inductive approach. This therefore provides a library of general theorems that can be applied to other protocols.
Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are intended to ensure properties like secrecy, authentication, anonymity, integrity or non-repudiability. Initially proposed for securing communications, they have been more recently proposed for protecting the computation results of free-roaming mobile agents doing comparison shopping [26] . Experience shows that even simple protocols are difficult to set correctly [14] . Their correctness clearly needs to be checked by mechanical tools. But this cannot be an easy task. For instance, secrecy has been shown undecidable even under very weak assumptions [8] . And correctness is always with respect to a given model. A protocol correct in a model may be incorrect in a richer model [23] . As for the effectiveness of cryptography, which is often assumed perfect in the formal versions of protocols, fortunately, it may be precisely related to the one of real protocols [11] . Although we cannot expect formal methods to be able to deal with every possible problem (like [25] for instance), yet they provide better confidence and may serve in finding protocol-specific flows.
Many different approaches have been proposed so far. Approaches based on model-checking are quite effective but the state explosion forces the model to be kept simple, typically by limiting the number of agents and other parameters to one or two although, in some cases, checking can be done in a finite model [13] . Approaches based on proof assistants allow a finer and more general modelization but require much effort, typically of several days or weeks, although the use of automated theorem provers may be very effective too [6] . Proof-assistants (Isabelle [18] , PVS [24] , etc.) can establish protocol-independent theorems whose conditions could be proved by means of specialized automatic tools, providing a really complete certification. In this spirit, Millen and Rueß formalized a protocol-independent secrecy theorem [15] in PVS [16] and later developed with Cortier an automatic proof search procedure [7] .
In this paper, we develop in Isabelle a more general secrecy theorem based on Paulson's inductive approach [21] , which has several advantages over the previous approach. First, we require no additional information (spell or state events) in order to be more general and also compatible with the libraries already implemented in Isabelle by Paulson and Bella. Second, we establish a first secrecy theorem (Section 3) which only involves the Isabelle theory of messages, and thus is independent of any protocol formalization. It is based on the simple and intuitive notion of guarded messages which, as opposed to the notion of coideal used in [15] , distinguishes between what must be kept secret (a key or a nonce ın) from how this secret is ensured (the set ıKs of the keys whose inverses are used for encrypting ın). It simply says that, if someone can get ın by decomposing and decrypting a set of guarded messages, then he must also be able to get one of the key of ıKs. Therefore, if the keys of ıKs are not compromised, then the spy cannot get ın.
Then, we establish a second theorem (Section 4) showing that, for proving the guardedness of a nonce or a key ın used in a protocol, and hence that ın is kept secret, it is sufficient to prove that each rule of the protocol indeed preserve the guardedness of ın, without having to care about what the spy can do (which is taken into account once and for all in the proof of the theorem). This departs from proofs in strand spaces [10] or with coideals [7] where it is necessary to step back into the protocol rules, including the rules for the spy, in order to explore every possibility of how certain message fields could have been published.
We applied our results to several well-known protocols: Needham-SchoederLowe [17, 14] , Otway-Rees [19] and Yahalom [1] . We also verified two protocols proposed by Asokan, Gülcü and Karjoth [2] for protecting the computation results of free-roaming mobile agents doing comparison shopping. These have never been formally certified before. The properties claimed by the authors (see Section 5) not only include confidentiality properties but also non-repudiability and integrity properties. This shows a new application of Isabelle.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we quickly present Paulson's inductive approach [21] . In Section 3, we present our notion of guarded message for proving secrecy. In Section 4, we introduce a more precise formalization of protocols and show how it helps to prove guardedness. In Section 5, we present the protocols P1 and P2 proposed in [2] for protecting the computation results of free-roaming agents. In Section 6, we explain the formal proof of their correctness.
All the Isabelle files are freely available on our web page.
Paulson's inductive approach
The inductive approach has been introduced by Paulson [21] and applied to many non-trivial protocols within the generic proof assistant Isabelle [18] : Kerberos IV [3] , TLS [22] , SET [20] , etc. All these results are part of the Isabelle distribution and can be freely used to certify other protocols. In this approach, a protocol is represented as the set of all the possible sequences of events that can occur by following the protocol steps and by having a spy able to send fake messages built from the analysis of past traffic. An infinite number of agents is assumed: This has several important consequences:
• Encryption is assumed to be perfect: decryption can only be done by using the inverse of the key used for encryption. Within a public-key infrastructure, the inverse of the public key of an agent ıA, ıpubK A, is its private key ıpriK A. Otherwise, each agent ıA is assumed to have a symmetric key ıshrK A whose inverse is itself.
• Hashing is collision-free: two distinct messages give two distinct hash codes.
This comes from the fact that the constructors of an inductive data type are injective.
• Each kind of message is recognizable and hence cannot be confused with another one: an agent name ıAgent A is distinct from a key ıKey K or an encrypted message ıCrypt K X, etc. This comes from the fact that the constructors of an inductive data type have distinct images. This implies that encryption schemes for which there are relations between encrypted messages like XOR (ıCrypt K (Crypt K X) = X) or RSA (ıCrypt K (Crypt K' X) = Crypt K' (Crypt K X)) cannot be formalized.
Then, Paulson introduces three important functions:
• The function ıparts H returns the set of all the actual sub-components of a set ıH of messages (ıX is not a sub-component of ıHash X):
consts parts :: "msg set ⇒ msg set" inductive "parts H" intros Inj: "X ∈ H =⇒ X ∈ parts H" Fst: "{|X,Y|} ∈ parts H =⇒ X ∈ parts H" Snd: "{|X,Y|} ∈ parts H =⇒ Y ∈ parts H" Body: "Crypt K X ∈ parts H =⇒ X ∈ parts H"
• The function ıanalz H returns the set of all the sub-components that can be obtained by decomposing and decrypting (if the necessary key has itself been obtained) all the messages of the set ıH:
consts analz :: "msg set => msg set" inductive "analz H" intros Inj: "X ∈ H =⇒ X ∈ analz H" Fst: "{|X,Y|} ∈ analz H =⇒ X ∈ analz H" Snd: "{|X,Y|} ∈ analz H =⇒ Y ∈ analz H"
• The function ısynth returns the set of all the messages that can be synthesized from a set ıH of messages (new nonces and new keys cannot be synthesized):
consts synth :: "msg set ⇒ msg set" inductive "synth H" intros Inj: "X ∈ H =⇒ X ∈ synth H" Agent: "Agent agt ∈ synth H" Number: "Number n ∈ synth H" Hash: "X ∈ synth H =⇒ Hash X ∈ synth H" Pair:
Finally, the fact that an agent ıA sends to another agent ıB a message ıX is represented by the event ıSays A B X.
As an example, we give the formalization of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol [14] : The first two rules are in any protocol. ıNil means that the empty trace ı[] is in the protocol. ıFake means that the spy can send fake messages built from the analysis of past traffic. The next rules are the rules of the protocol. ıset evs is the set of all the messages sent so far. ıused evs denotes the parts of all the messages sent so far. ıev # evs is the list of head ıev and tail ıevs.
Then, one may prove for example that, if ıB sends the message of step 2 and receives the message of step 3, and if the private keys of ıA and ıB are not compromised (ıA and ıB do not belong to the set ıbad of bad agents), then the protocol must have been initiated by ıA:
∈ bad; B / ∈ bad; evs ∈ nsl; Says B A (Crypt (pubK A) {|Nonce NA, Nonce NB, Agent B|}) ∈ set evs; Says A' B (Crypt(pubK B) (Nonce NB)) ∈ set evs]] =⇒ Says A B (Crypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) ∈ set evs" As most authentication properties, it relies on the fact that the nonces used by the agents and encrypted with their public keys are not known by the spy:
∈ bad; B / ∈ bad; evs ∈ nsl; Says A B (Crypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|}) ∈ set evs]] =⇒ Nonce NA / ∈ analz(spies evs)"
This is why, in the following, we concentrate on secrecy proofs.
Guarded messages
The idea of the protocol-independent secrecy theorem is simple and intuitive. In any protocol, secrecy is ensured by using cryptography and by making sure that the key used for the encryption is indeed safe. We simply turn this into a formal definition, the notion of guarded message, and formally prove that getting the secret indeed requires to know the key used for encryption (normally safe).
Definition 1 (Guarded messages). A nonce or a key ın is guarded in a message ıX by a set of keys ıKs if every occurrence of ın in ıX is inside a submessage encrypted by the inverse of a key of ıKs. We denote by ıguard n Ks the set of messages in which ın is guarded by ıKs.
consts guard :: "nat ⇒ key set ⇒ msg set" inductive "guard n Ks" intros No Nonce: "Nonce n / ∈ parts X =⇒ X ∈ guard n Ks" Guard: "invKey K ∈ Ks =⇒ Crypt K X ∈ guard n Ks" Crypt: "X ∈ guard n Ks =⇒ Crypt K X ∈ guard n Ks" Pair: "[[X ∈ guard n Ks; Y ∈ guard n Ks]] =⇒ {|X,Y|} ∈ guard n Ks"
The secrecy theorem can then be stated as follows:
Theorem 2 (Secrecy). Let ıG be a set of messages where ıNonce n is guarded by a set of keys ıKs. If ıNonce n belongs to ıanalz G then there exists a key ıK in ıKs that belongs to ıanalz G:
Proof. Although this result may seem obvious, it is not straightforward to prove in Isabelle or in any other proof assistant. We explain how our formal proof proceeds.
First, only a finite part of ıG needs to be analyzed to get ıNonce n. Therefore, we can assume that ıG is finite. We then associate to any finite set ıG a measure µ(ıG) which is the number of encrypted messages in ıG. We can then reason by induction on µ(ıG).
Second, to help reason about ıanalz, we proved the following very useful decomposition theorem: ıanalz G = ıpparts G ∪ ıanalz (ıkparts G), where ıpparts G is all the pairs of ıG, their components that are themselves pairs and so on, and ıkparts G is all the components that are not pairs. Now, since all the messages in ıG are guarded, to get ıNonce n, there must be an encrypted message ıCrypt K Y in ıkparts G such that ıKey (ıinvKey K) belongs to ıkparts G also: we must decrypt at least one encrypted message for reaching ıNonce n. If ıK is a key of ıKs then we are done. Otherwise, let ıH = ıkparts G \ {ıCrypt K Y}. Then, by definition of ıanalz, ıNonce n must belong to ıanalz (ıH ∪ {ıY}) whose measure is strictly smaller than the one of ıG. Therefore, we can conclude by induction hypothesis.
⊓ ⊔ Our notion of guardedness has several advantages over the notion of coideal of Millen and Rueß [15] . First, it is defined inductively while a coideal is defined as the complement of an ideal [9] (which is defined inductively). Second, it is more general in the sense that the coideal of {ıNonce n} ∪ ıKs is included in ıguard n Ks but not the converse. For instance, while ıKey K is guarded by {ıK} in ıCrypt (ıinvKey K) (ıKey K), it does not belong to the coideal of {ıK}. This is due to the fact that there is no separation between what must be kept secret (ın in ıguard n Ks) and how it must be kept secret (ıKs in ıguard n Ks). Third, guardedness enjoys a nice monotonicity property: lemma guard extend: "Ks ⊆ Ks' =⇒ guard n Ks ⊆ guard n Ks'" which is very useful in the case of protocols like Yahalom where a nonce must be guarded by a session key issued by a server (see below). This is not the case with coideals. For instance, {|ıCrypt (ıpubK A) (ıNonce n), ıKey K|}, in which ıNonce n is guarded by {ıNonce n, priK A}, hence by {ıNonce n, priK A, Key K} too, belongs to the coideal of {ıNonce n, priK A} but not to the coideal of {ıNonce n, priK A, Key K}. So, guardedness is a finer and more intuitive notion than the one of coideals.
In the case of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol, one can formally prove that ıNA and ıNB are both guarded by ı{priK A,priK B}. Therefore, after our theorem, if the private keys of ıA and ıB are not compromised then the spy cannot have access to ıNA and ıNB. We applied our theorem to other well known protocols: the Otway-Rees symmetric-key protocol [19] and the Yahalom symmetric-key protocol [1] . By doing so, we noticed a much shorter development time compared with the direct proofs done by Paulson [21] . Of course, this is not as fast as automatic tools like TAPS [6] but we expect to define tactics to automate these guardedness proofs.
The Yahalom protocol is interesting since it is a simple case of dependency between secrets [23] . We recall the informal definition of the protocol (S denotes the server):
One can prove that the session key ıK is guarded by the keys of ıA and ıB, and that the nonce ıNB is guarded by the keys of ıA and ıB and all the session keys issued by the server: In our formalization, the server may issue several session keys for the same request by repeating step 3. This may be avoided by checking whether step 3 has already been done. Note also that the set of keys ıKs used here takes care of two different states of the protocol: if no session key has been issued yet then, indeed, only the keys of ıA and ıB are sufficient for protecting ıNB.
Guardedness proofs
In order to ease guardedness proofs, we have developed other theorems inspired by the work of Millen and Rueß [15] . The idea is to reduce the proof for all possible traces to a proof that all the protocol rules preserve the guardedness condition. This requires to introduce a more precise formalization of the notion of protocol. Now, a protocol will be seen as a set of rules:
Definition 3 (Protocol rule
types proto = "(event set * event) set" Then, the traces generated by a protocol are inductively defined as follows: An ıs-instance of a rule ıR can be added to a trace ıevs if the ıs-instance of every precondition occurs in ıevs and the ıs-instance of every new nonce has not been used yet: preserv p n Ks = ∀ evs R' s' R s. evs ∈ tr p −→ fresh R' s' n Ks evs −→ Guard n Ks (spies evs) −→ safe Ks (spies evs) −→ ok evs R s −→ ap s (snd R) ∈ guard n Ks safe Ks (spies evs) = ∀ K. K ∈ Ks −→ K / ∈ analz(spies evs)
Then, if ın is also guarded in the initial knowledge of the spy, we get that ın is guarded in every possible trace:
theorem preserv Guard: "[[preserv p n Ks; evs ∈ tr p; fresh R' s' n Ks evs; safe Ks (spies evs); Guard n Ks (init Spy)]] =⇒ Guard n Ks (spies evs)"
Examples
As an example, let us see the case of the Otway-Rees protocol [19] Let us prove the preservation property. We only detail the case of ıNB, the case of ıNA is similar. Assume that ıNB has been introduced by an instance of ıOR2 and is guarded by {ıshrK B}.
OR1:
Assuming that ıNA' is a new nonce, we must prove that ıNB is guarded in ıP = ı{|Nonce NA', Agent A', Agent B', Crypt (shrK A') {|Nonce NA', Agent A', Agent B'|}|}. Since ıNA' is new, it cannot be equal to ıNB. Guardedness is therefore immediate since ıNB does not occur in ıP. OR2: Assuming that ıNB' is a new nonce and that ıNB is guarded in ı{|Nonce NA', Agent A', Agent B', X|}, we must prove that ıNB is guarded in ı{|Nonce NA', Agent A', Agent B', X, Crypt (shrK B') {|Nonce NA', Nonce NB', Agent A', Agent B'|}|}. Again, since ıNB' is new, it cannot be equal to ıNB. Therefore, we are left with the case when ıNA' is equal to ıNB. But, since ıNB is guarded in ı{|Nonce NA', Agent A', Agent B', X|}, ıNA' cannot be equal to ıNB and we are done. OR3: Assuming that ıNB is guarded in ıP = ı{|Nonce NA', Agent A', Agent B', Crypt (shrK A') {|Nonce NA',Agent A',Agent B'|}, Crypt (shrK B') {|Nonce NA',Nonce NB',Agent A',Agent B'|}|}, we must prove that ıNB is guarded in ıQ = ı{|Nonce NA', Crypt (shrK A') {|Nonce NA',Key KAB|}, Crypt (shrK B') {|Nonce NB', Key KAB|}|}. Since ıNB is guarded in ıP, ıNA' cannot be equal to ıNB because ıNA' is not guarded in ıP. Therefore, ıNB is guarded in ıQ. OR4: Assuming that ıNB is guarded in ı{|Nonce NA',Agent A',Agent B',X, Crypt (shrK B') {|Nonce NA', Nonce NB', Agent A', Agent B'|}|} and in ıP = ı{|Nonce NA',Y,Crypt (shrK B') {|Nonce NB', Key KAB|}|}, we must prove that ıNB is guarded in ı{|Nonce NA',Y|}. Since ıNB is guarded in ıP, it cannot be equal to ıNA' and it is guarded in ıY also. Therefore, ıNB is guarded in ıQ.
With this protocol, the preservation of guardedness does not require any extra property but, in general, it is necessary to have unicity lemmas [21, 6] . Let us see for instance the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol. Assume that ıNA has been introduced by an instance of ıNS1 and is guarded by {ıpriK A, priK B}. The case of ıNB is similar.
NS1:
Assuming that ıNA' is a new nonce, we must prove that ıNA is guarded in ıP = ıCrypt (pubK B') {|Nonce NA', Agent A'|}. Since ıNA' is new, it cannot be equal to ıNA. Thus, ıNA is guarded in ıP. NS2: Assuming that ıNB' is a new nonce and that ıNA is guarded in ıCrypt (pubK B') {|Nonce NA', Agent A'|}, we must prove that ıNA is guarded in ıP = ıCrypt (pubK A') {|Nonce NA', Nonce NB', Agent B'|}. Again, since ıNB' is new, it cannot be equal to ıNA. So, we are left with the case when ıNA' = ıNA. But then, the trace contains two messages: ıCrypt (pubK B') {|Nonce NA, Agent A'|} and ıCrypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|} for ıNA has been introduced with ıNS1. Since ıNA is not known to the spy (the trace is assumed to be guarded), this cannot happen: we must have ıA = ıA' (see below). Hence, ıNA is guarded in ıP. NS3: Assuming that ıNA is guarded in ıCrypt (pubK B') {|Nonce NA', Agent A'|} and in ıCrypt (pubK A') {|Nonce NA', Nonce NB', Agent B'|}, we must prove that it is guarded in ıP = ıCrypt (pubK B') (Nonce NB'). Assume that ıNB' = ıNA. Then, the trace contains two messages: ıCrypt (pubK A') {|Nonce NA', Nonce NA, Agent B'|} and ıCrypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|} for ıNA has been introduced with ıNS1. Since ıNA is not known to the spy, this cannot happen (see below). Therefore, we must have ıNB' = ıNA and ıNA is guarded in ıP.
To prove the guardedness, we used the following two unicity lemmas, which are easily proved:
lemma "[[evs ∈ nsl; Crypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|} ∈ parts(spies evs);
Crypt (pubK B') {|Nonce NA, Agent A'|} ∈ parts(spies evs); Nonce NA / ∈ analz (spies evs)]] =⇒ A=A' & B=B'" lemma "[[evs ∈ nsl; Crypt (pubK B) {|Nonce NA, Agent A|} ∈ parts(spies evs);
Crypt(pubK B') {|Nonce NA', Nonce NA, Agent A'|} ∈ parts(spies evs)]] =⇒ Nonce NA ∈ analz (spies evs)"
Similar lemmas hold for ıNB. They can be seen as two distinct instances of the same unicity lemma: if two rules that should introduce new nonces in fact introduce the same nonce in two guarded messages, and if this nonce is not known to the spy, then the two messages must be equal.
Comparaison with Cortier, Millen and Rueß' work
In [15] , the proof of unicity lemmas is avoided by introducing additional information in the definition of protocols, the spell events, that indicate the nonces and keys that must be kept secret and the agents allowed to have access to them, and by enforcing the disjointness of spell events.
The guardedness proofs often follow the same pattern and use the same lemmas (that a new nonce is distinct from the nonce for which we want to prove the guardedness condition, the unicity lemmas, etc.). We therefore expect to turn this into an Isabelle tactic which would try to prove the guardedness automatically by using these lemmas.
Cortier, Millen and Rueß [7] define a search procedure for proving a similar property, the occultness. But, since it does not take into account the origin of a secret (the ıfresh predicate in our formalization), it needs to step back into the protocol rules and the ıFake rule of the spy to get sufficient information for concluding, and this may not terminate. Furthermore, they require yet other information in the definitions of protocols, the state events, whose usefulness for occultness proofs is not clear.
As an important and new application, we used our theorem to formally certify in Isabelle the correctness of some of the protocols proposed by Asokan, Gülcü and Karjoth in [2] for protecting the computation results of free-roaming agents. These protocols tolerate collusion between servers and unfixed itineraries. They formalize and extend protocols proposed by Yee [26] . Application areas of these protocols include comparison shopping, bidding and network routing [5] . Following the authors, we will use the vocabulary of comparison shopping, hence using the word "shop" to denote a server, and the word "offer" to denote the answer of a shop to an agent's request.
These protocols are not concerned with the security problems raised by the use of mobile agents: aside from the correctness of the implementations of servers and mobile agents, that servers indeed execute the mobile agents code, and that servers and agents are indeed protected against malicious agents [26, 4, 12] .
The jump of an agent from a server S 1 to a server S 2 can be seen as S 1 sending to S 2 a message representing the state of the agent. It therefore fits with our model. The difficulty here is that the itinerary is not known a priori: the set of servers to be visited can be chosen and extended by the agent itself. This is the case when an agent is programmed to go to some information servers which may provide it with addresses of shops or other information servers.
Asokan, Gülcü and Karjoth propose four protocols called P1, P2, P3 and P4 depending on the properties one would like and the available infrastructure. P1 and P2 require a public-key infrastructure. In P1, the author of an offer is not kept secret and the integrity of data is publicly verifiable while, in P2, the author of an offer can only be known to the owner of the agent. P3 and P4 do not assume a public-key infrastructure and use message authentication codes (MAC) instead. These last two protocols do not ensure non-repudiability. We formally proved all the properties claimed by the authors for P1 and P2. We left for future work the proof of P3 and P4.
All the protocols have a common structure: first, the owner of the agent sends his agent to the first server and, second, each server receiving the agent sends it to the next server after having added his own offer, this last step being repeated until the agent comes back to its owner. The difference between the protocols lie in the way the messages containing the offers are built.
For describing the state of the agent in P1 and P2, we adopted the message format ı{|Agent A, Number r, I, L|} where: -ıAgent A is the owner of the agent, -ıNumber r is the agent's request, -ıI is the list of servers to be visited, -ıL is the list of offers collected so far.
We choose to send the request and the list of servers to be visited in the clear. This is not specified in [2] but we may assume that, in practice, the request is implemented as a public data and the itinerary as a private data. However, a malicious server executing the agent could easily know about the itinerary, even though some encryption is used. So, there is no point in hiding this information.
On the other hand, we must keep in mind that a malicious server can get important information from the itinerary stored in the agent and the way the offers are stored also. Indeed, assume that two servers S 1 and S 2 collude. If S 1 sends to S 2 the itinerary and the offers of the agent when the agent was at S 1 , then S 2 can try to guess to whom belong the offers. As suggested in [2] , a way to make this more difficult is to shuffle the offers after each new offer.
Furthermore, even if a server does not try to alter the offers collected so far by an agent, it may not give its best offer. Indeed, if it succeeds to know the offers collected by the agent so far, it may give an offer which is just a little bit better, but not as good as it could. This looks like a Vickery auction (the highest bidder pays the second highest bid) but upside-down: the best server offers the second lowest price [26] .
Then, we formalized P1 and P2 as follows: ıNil and ıFake are the usual rules for the empty trace and the spy respectively. ıReq corresponds to the first step, the sending of the agent by its owner. We use an unguessable message, ıNonce n, to identify the session. ıProp corresponds to the second step, the addition of an offer by a server. The offer is represented by an unguessable nonce, ıNonce ofr. ıagl is the subset of messages representing lists of agents. ıisin (Agent C, app (J, del (Agent B, I))) means that the next server ıC is picked among the agents of ıI, except the first occurrence of ıB, or among a new list of agents ıJ. Finally, ıreqm and ıprom are the request message and the proposition message respectively. They are specific to each protocol.
The properties claimed to hold for these two protocols are the following:
-Data confidentiality: only the owner of the agent can extract the offers.
-Non-repudiability: a shop cannot repudiate an offer once it has been received by the owner of the agent. -Forward privacy: (for P2) none of the identities of the shops can be extracted.
-Strong forward integrity: except the last one, offers cannot be modified.
-Publicly verifiable forward integrity: (for P1 only) anyone can verify the integrity of a list of offers. -Insertion resilience: no offer can be inserted between two previous offers.
-Truncation resilience: the list of collected offers can be truncated only at an offer whose author colludes with the attacker.
Note that forward privacy only means that no one can extract the identity of the shops by looking only at the list of offers. This does not mean that the identity of shops cannot be inferred by other means as described above.
The idea proposed by Asokan, Gülcü and Karjoth for ensuring insertion resilience, truncation resilience and a stronger form of forward integrity than the one proposed by Yee [26] is to add unforgeable dependencies between offers, creating what they call a chaining relation:
-The agent starts with a hash of the message made of the identity of the first server to be visited ıB, salted with some random number ık: ıHash {|Agent B, Nonce k|} -Then, within its offer, signed with its private key, each shop must add a hash of the message made of the previous offer ıM together with the next server ıC to be visited: ıHash {|M, Agent C|}.
The complete definition of ıchain B ofr A L C is as follows for P1:
sign B {|Crypt (pubK A) (Nonce ofr), Hash {|head L,Agent C|}|} and as follows for P2:
where ıhead L denotes the previous offer collected by the agent and ısign is the signature function defined by ısign B X = {|Agent B, X, Crypt (priK B) (Hash X)|}. The start of the chaining relation, ıanchor, is defined as a particular case of ıchain by ıanchor A n B = chain A n A (cons nil nil) B. Hence, if someone wants to modify or insert an offer, for the chaining relation to be preserved, he must be able to modify as well all the following offers, which is made a priori impossible by asking the shops to sign their offers with their private keys. The two remaining possible attacks are the deletion of the offers between two offers made by two colluding shops (or the same shop if the agent goes twice to the same malicious shop) or the deletion of all the offers (denialof-service attack), and the addition of fake offers. So, a shop cannot even modify its own offer unless it colludes with another shop visited later (which may be the same) but, in this case, it must delete all the intermediate offers. For limiting this difficult deletion/truncation problem, Asokan, Gülcü and Karjoth suggest a few solutions like adding several next shops instead of just one.
In our formalization, we do not need to include the salt random numbers r i used in [2] since the spy is not able to infer the content of encrypted messages if he does not know the inverse of the keys used for encrypting them (ıanalz function).
We can know present the formal definitions of the requests and propositions: In the request, ıA and ıB (the first server to be visited) are added to the itinerary ıI. In the proposition, ıB is deleted from ıI and a new list of servers ıJ is added.
Correctness of P1 and P2
For proving the strong forward integrity, the insertion resilience and the truncation resilience, we need to define what is a valid chaining relation:
inductive "valid A n B" intros Req: "cons (anchor A n B) nil ∈ valid A n B"
And to formalize the corresponding attacks, we use the following functions: For the data confidentiality, we first prove that both a request ın and an offer ıofr are guarded by the private key of the agent's owner. Then: lemma req notin spies: "[[evs ∈ p1; req A r n I B ∈ set evs; A / ∈ bad]] =⇒ Nonce n / ∈ analz (spies evs)" lemma pro notin spies: "[[evs ∈ p1; pro B ofr A r I L J C ∈ set evs; A / ∈ bad; B / ∈ bad]] =⇒ Nonce ofr / ∈ analz (spies evs)"
We also proved that requests and offers are not known by other agents (and not only by the spy as it is commonly done). Although this is not very complicated, this requires to extend the Isabelle libraries.
For the non-repudiability, we proved that the signature scheme is secure: We would like to point out that, although it was the first time we used Isabelle, thanks to the way we formalized P1 and the power of the Isabelle tactics (although, sometimes, we would like them to be less sensitive to some syntactical aspects), once P1 has been proved, it took us only a few minutes to formalize and prove P2 by essentially changing the definition of ıchain. It is easy to experiment with changes in message formats.
Conclusion and future work
Approaches based on proof assistants like Paulson's inductive approach [21] in Isabelle [18] are known to require much effort, typically several days or weeks, for certifying a protocol. Establishing general protocol-independent theorems like the ones we presented in this paper helps to reduce this development time and also to get a better understanding of protocol problems. To go further, automated theorem provers could be used or tactics developed for automatically proving the conditions of these theorems. In the case of our guardedness condition, it is clear from the examples we give that the proofs follow similar patterns. This is why we expect to define Isabelle tactics for doing that and also for proving the unicity lemmas automatically.
Finally, we did not take into account in our formalizations what some authors call the "oops" rule [23] , that is, the fact that, for some protocols like Yahalom, a particular session is not affected by the compromise of other session keys. But, instead of adding the oops rule and doing the proof again, one may look for conditions under which a secrecy property without oops implies the same property with oops. This would provide another important and useful protocol-independent result.
